6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

From its very inception the Russian state was a military soci-
721 ety. The military campaigns and territorial expansion were
565 needed in this society to provide land to pay for the services of
181 a class of military nobility whose chief occupation was state service and warfare, not land cultivation. War gave the Czar an opportunity to distribute land grants, to bestow ranks and offices and to win the support of the nobility. At the same time warfare offered an opportunity for the nobles to exert more personal power, to release their destructive urges, and to compensate for indignities and humiliations to which they were constantly exposed on the part of superiors in rank and office. Thus, by engaging these people in constant warfare the Czars directed their aggressive impulses against the enemy instead of against the ruler. The wars were not only a means of occupying a potentially restless and turbulent military class, but they were necessary to enhance the Czar's prestige, to solidify his rule, and to impress his subjects with the idea of his might and invincibility.

723 In such circumstances, prolonged and costly wars were to be avoided. The military nobility, whose loyalty to the Czar was conditioned upon his power and favors, could not be completely depended upon to remain loyal to the Czar under adverse conditions or in defeat. Therefore, in military campaigns the em-
725 phasis had to be put on numerical superiority over the enemy. Another way of fighting the enemies was to frighten them into retreat by sudden and unexpected attacks from ambush combined with wild sounds of the drums, trumpets and shouting, in Mongol fashion. Soldiers and officers were ready to flee if the enemy showed considerable resistance. Their preference was fighting from a distance, or from a place of advantage from where they could annoy the enemy, but hurt themselves least.[16] Hence their most common way of taking cities and fortresses
• [726] was by a siege, in the course of which they would force the population to surrender by means of mass starvation, or by provoking internal dissensions and treachery.[17] Small, weak and unprotected adversaries would be threatened into submission by "psychological warfare" methods without even resorting to an open war.[18]

727 In earlier days, the means employed to keep conquered people
636 in submission were the same as those practiced toward Russian